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Abstract. We consider collaborative systems where users make contribu-
tions across multiple available projects and are rewarded for their contri-
butions in individual projects according to a local sharing of the value pro-
duced. This serves as a model of online social computing systems such as
online Q&A forums and of credit sharing in scientific co-authorship settings.
We show that the maximum feasible produced value can be well approxi-
mated by simple local sharing rules where users are approximately rewarded
in proportion to their marginal contributions and that this holds even under
incomplete information about the player’s abilities and effort constraints.
For natural instances we show almost 95% optimality at equilibrium. When
players incur a cost for their effort, we identify a threshold phenomenon:
the efficiency is a constant fraction of the optimal when the cost is strictly
convex and decreases with the number of players if the cost is linear.
1 Introduction
Many economic domains involve self-interested agents who participate in multiple
joint ventures by investing time, effort, money or other personal resources, so as to
produce some value that is then shared among the participants. Examples include
traditional surplus sharing games [18,6], co-authorship settings where the wealth
produced is in the form of credit in scientific projects, that is implicitly split among
the authors of a paper [14] and online services contexts where users collaborate
on various projects and are rewarded by means of public reputation, achievement
awards, badges or webpage attention (e.g. Q&A Forums such as Yahoo! Answers,
Quora, and StackOverflow [7,8,9,5,2,13], open source projects [19,24,27,11,28]).
We study the global efficiency of simple and prefixed rules for sharing the value
locally at each project, even in the presence of incomplete information on the player’s
abilities and private resource constraints and even if players employ learning strate-
gies to decide how to play in the game.
The design of simple, local and predetermined mechanisms is important for ap-
plications such as sharing attention in online Q&A forums or scientific co-authorship
⋆ Work performed in part while an intern with Microsoft Research. Supported in part by
ONR grant N00014-98-1-0589 and NSF grants CCF-0729006 and a Simons Graduate
Fellowship.
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scenarios, where cooperative game theoretic solution concepts, that require ad-hoc
negotiations and global redistribution of value, are less appropriate.
Robustness to incomplete information is essential in online application settings
where players are unlikely to have full knowledge of the abilities of the other players.
Instead, participants have only distributional knowledge about their opponents.
Additionally, public signals, such as reputation ranks, achievement boards, and
history of accomplishments may result in a significant asymmetry in the beliefs
about a player’s abilities. Therefore, any efficiency guarantee should be robust to
the distributional beliefs and should carry over, even if player abilities are arbitrary
asymmetrically distributed.
In our main result we show that if locally at each project each player is awarded
at least his marginal contribution to the value, then every equilibrium is a 2-
approximation to the optimal outcome. This holds even when player’s abilities and
resource constraints are private information drawn from commonly known distribu-
tions and even when players use no-regret learning strategies to play the game. We
portray several simple mechanisms that satisfy this property, such as sharing pro-
portionally to the quality of the submission. Additionally, we give a generalization
of our theorem, when players don’t have hard constraints on their resources, but
rather have soft constraints in the form of convex cost functions. Finally, we give
natural classes of instances where near optimality is achieved in equilibrium.
Our Results. We consider a model of collaboration where the system consists
of set of players and a set of projects. Each player has a budget of time which he
allocates across his projects. If a player invests some effort in some project, this re-
sults in some submission of a certain quality, which is a player and project specific
increasing concave function of the effort, that depends on the player’s abilities. Each
project produces some value which is a monotone submodular function of the quali-
ties of the submissions of the different participants. This common value produced by
each project is then shared among the participants of the project according to some
pre-specified sharing rule, e.g. equal sharing, or sharing proportionally to quality.
1. Marginal Contribution and Simple Sharing Rules. We show that if
each player is awarded at least his marginal contribution to the value of a project, lo-
cally, then every Nash equilibrium achieves at least half of the optimal social welfare.
This holds at coarse correlated equilibria of the complete information game when
player’s abilities and budget are common knowledge and at Bayes-Nash equilibria
when these parameters are drawn independently from commonly known arbitrary
distributions. Our result is based on showing that the resulting game is universally
(1, 1)-smooth game [21,22,25] and corresponds to a generalization of Vetta’s [26]
valid utility games to incomplete information settings. We give examples of simple
sharing rules that satisfy the above condition, such as proportional to the marginal
contribution or based on the Shapley value or proportional to the quality. We show
that this bound is tight for very special cases of the class of games that we study and
holds even for the best pure Nash equilibrium of the complete information setting
and even when the equilibrium is unique. We also analyze ranking-based sharing
rules and show that they can approximately satisfy the marginal contribution con-
dition, leading only to logarithmic in the number of players loss.
2. Near Optimality for Constant Elasticity. We show that for the case
when the value produced at each project is of the form v(x) = w · xα for α ∈ (0, 1),
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where x is the sum of the submission qualities, then the simple proportional to
quality sharing rule achieves almost 95% of the optimal welfare at every pure Nash
equilibrium of the game, which always exists.
3. Soft Budget Constraints and a Threshold Phenomenon. When the
players have soft budget constraints in the form of some convex cost function of
their total effort, we characterize the inefficiency as a function of the convexity of
the cost functions, as captured by the standard measure of elasticity. We show that
if the elasticity is strictly greater than 1 (strictly convex), then the inefficiency both
in terms of produced value and in terms of social welfare (including player costs) is a
constant independent of the number of players, that converges to 2 as the elasticity
goes to infinity (hard budget constraint case). This stands in a stark contrast with
the case when the cost functions are linear, where we show that the worst-case
efficiency can decrease linearly with the number of players.
Applications. In the context of social computing each project represents a
specific topic on a user-generated website such as Yahoo! Answers, Quora, and
StackOverflow. Each web user has a budget of time that he spends on such a web
service, which he chooses how to split among different topics/questions that arise.
The quality of the response of a player is dependent on his effort and on his abilities
which are most probably private information. The attention produced is implicitly
split among the responders of the topic in a non-uniform manner, since the higher
the slot that the response is placed in the feed, the higher the attention it gets.
Hence, the website designer has the power to implicitly choose the attention-sharing
mechanism locally at each topic, by strategically ordering the responses according
to their quality and potentially randomizing, with the goal of maximizing the global
attention on his web-service.
Another interesting application of our work is in the context of sharing scientific
credit in paper co-authorship scenarios. One could think of players as researchers
splitting their time among different scientific projects. Given the efforts of the au-
thors at each project there is some scientific credit produced. Local sharing rules in
this scenario translate to scientific credit-sharing rules among the authors of a pa-
per, which is implicitly accomplished through the order that authors appear in the
paper. Different ordering conventions in different communities correspond to dif-
ferent sharing mechanisms, with the alphabetical ordering corresponding to equal
sharing of the credit while the contribution ordering is an instance of a sharing
mechanism where a larger credit is rewarded to those who contributed more.
Related Work. Our model has a natural application in the context of online
crowdsourcing mechanisms which were recently investigated by Ghosh and Hum-
mel [7,8], Ghosh and McAfee [9], Chawla, Hartline and Sivan [4] and Jain, Chen, and
Parkes [13]. All this prior work focuses on a single project. In contrast, we consider
multiple projects across which a contributor can strategically invest his effort. We
also allow a more general class of project value functions. Having multiple projects
creates endogenous outside options that significantly affect equilibrium outcomes.
DiPalantino and Vojnovic´ [5] studied a model of crowdsourcing where users can
choose exactly one project out of a set of multiple projects, each offering a fixed
prize and using a “winner-take-all” sharing rule. In contrast, we allow the value
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shared to be increasing in the invested efforts and allow individual contributors to
invest their efforts across multiple projects.
Splitting scientific credit among collaborators was recently studied by Kleinberg
and Oren [14], who again examined players choosing a single project. They show
how to globally change the project value functions so that optimality is achieved at
some equilibrium of the perturbed game.
There have been several works on the efficiency of equilibria of utility maxi-
mization games [26,10,16], also relating efficiency with the marginal contribution
property. However, this body of related work focused only on the complete informa-
tion setting. For general games, Roughgarden [21] gave a unified framework, called
smoothness, for capturing most efficiency bounds in games and showed that bounds
proven via the smoothness framework automatically extend to learning outcomes.
Recently, Roughgarden [22] and Syrgkanis [25] gave a variation of the smooth-
ness framework that also extends to incomplete information settings. Additionally,
Roughgarden and Schoppmann gave a version of the framework that allows for
tighter bounds when the strategy space of the players is some convex set. In this
work we utilize these frameworks to prove our results.
Our collaboration model is also related to the contribution games model of [1].
However, in [1], the authors assume that all players get the same value from a
project. This corresponds to the special case of equal sharing rule in our model.
Moreover, they mainly focus on network games where each project is restricted to
two participants.
Our model is also somewhat related to the bargaining literature [12,15,3]. The
main question in that literature is similar to what we ask here: how should a com-
monly produced value be split among the participants. However, our approach is
very different than the bargaining literature as we focus on simple mechanisms that
use only local information of a project and not global properties of the game.
2 Collaboration Model
Our model of collaboration is defined with respect to a set N of n players and a set
M of m available projects. Each player i participates in a set of projects Mi and
has a budget of effort Bi, that he chooses how to distribute among his projects.
Thus the strategy of player i is specified by the amount of effort xji ∈ R+ that he
invests in project j ∈Mi.
Player Abilities. Each player i is characterized by his type ti, which is drawn from
some abstract type space Ti, and which determines his abilities on different projects
as well as his budget. When player i invests an effort of xji on project j this results in
a submission of quality qji (x
j
i ; ti), which depends on his type, and which we assume
to be some continuously differentiable, increasing concave function of his effort that
is zero at zero.
For instance, the quality may be linear with respect to effort qji (x
j
i ) = a
j
i · xji ,
where aji is some project-specific ability factor for the player that is part of his
type. In the context of Q&A forums, the effort xji corresponds to the amount of
time spent by a participant to produce some answer at question j, the budget
Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments 5
corresponds to the amount of time that the user spends on the forum, the ability
factor aji corresponds to how knowledgeable he is on topic j and q
j
i corresponds to
the quality of his response.
Project Value Functions. Each project j ∈ M is associated with a value function
vj(q
j), that maps the vector of submitted qualities qj = (qji )i∈Nj into a produced
value (where Nj is the set of players that participate in the project). This function,
represents the profit or revenue that can be generated by utilizing the submissions.
In the context, of Q&A forums vj(q
j) could for instance correspond to the webpage
attention produced by a set of responses to a question.
We assume that this value is increasing in the quality of each submission and that
it satisfies the diminishing marginal returns property, i.e. the marginal contribution
of an extra quality decreases as the existing submission qualities increase. More
formally, we assume that the value is submodular with respect to the lattice defined
on R|Nj |: for any z ≥ y ∈ R|Nj | (coordinate-wise) and any w ∈ R|Nj|:
vj(w ∨ z)− vj(z) ≤ vj(w ∨ y)− vj(y), (1)
where ∨ denotes the coordinate-wise maximum of two vectors. For instance, the
value could be any concave function of the sum of the submitted qualities or it
could be the maximum submitted quality vj(q
j) = maxi∈Nj q
j
i .
Local Value Sharing. We assume that the produced value vj(q
j) is shared lo-
cally among all the participants of the project, based on some predefined redis-
tribution mechanism. The mechanism observes the submitted qualities qj and de-
cides a share uji (q
j) of the project value that is assigned to player i, such that∑
i∈Nj u
j
i (q
j) = vj(q
j). The utility of a player i is the sum of his shares across his
projects:
∑
j∈Mi u
j
i (q
j).
In the context of Q&A forums, the latter mechanism corresponds to a local
sharing rule of splitting the attention at each topic. Such a sharing rule can be
achieved by ordering the submissions according to some function of their qualities
and potentially randomizing to achieve the desired sharing portions.
From Effort to Quality Space. We start our analysis by observing that the
utility of a player is essentially determined only by the submitted qualities and that
there is a one-to-one correspondence between submitted quality and input effort.
Hence, we can think of the players as choosing target submission qualities for each
project rather than efforts. For a player to submit a quality of qji he has to exert
effort xji (q
j
i ; ti), which is the inverse of q
j
i (·; ti) and hence is some increasing convex
function, that depends on the player’s type. Then the strategy space of a player is
simply be the set:
Qi(ti) =

qi = (qji )j∈Mi :
∑
j∈Mi
xji (q
j
i ; ti) ≤ Bi(ti)

 (2)
From here on we work with the latter representation of the game and define every-
thing in quality space rather than the effort space. Hence, the utility of a player
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under a submitted quality profile q, such that qi ∈ Qi(ti) is:
ui(q; ti) =
∑
j∈Mi u
j
i (q
j). (3)
and minus infinity if qi /∈ Qi(ti).
Social Welfare. We assume that the value produced is completely shared among
the participants of a project, and therefore, the social welfare is equal to the total
value produced, assuming players choose feasible strategies for their type:
SW t(q) =
∑
i∈N ui(q; ti) =
∑
j∈M vj(q
j) = V (q). (4)
We are interested in examining the social welfare achieved at the equilibria of the
resulting game when compared to the optimal social welfare. For a given type profile
t we will denote with OPT(t) = maxq∈Q(t) SW t(q) the maximum achievable welfare.
Equilibria, Existence and Efficiency. We examine both the complete and the
incomplete information setting. In the complete information setting, the type (e.g.
abilities, budget) of all the players is fixed and common knowledge. We analyze
the efficiency of Nash equilibria and of outcomes that arise from no-regret learning
strategies of the players when the game is played repeatedly. A Nash equilibrium is
a strategy profile where no player can increase his utility by unilaterally deviating.
An outcome of a no-regret learning strategy in the limit corresponds to a coarse
correlated equilibrium of the game, which is a correlated distribution over strategy
profiles, such that no player wants to deviate to some fixed strategy. We note that
such outcomes always exist, since no-regret learning algorithms for playing games
exist. When the sharing rule induces a game where each players utility is concave
with respect to his submitted quality and continuous (e.g. Shapley value) then even
a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in our class of games, by the classic
result of Rosen [20].
In the incomplete information setting the type ti of each player is private and is
drawn independently from some commonly known distribution Fi on Ti. This defines
an incomplete information game where players strategies are mappings si(ti), from
types to (possibly randomized) actions, which in our game corresponds to feasible
quality vectors. Under this assumption we quantify the efficiency of Bayes-Nash
equilibria of the resulting incomplete information game, i.e. strategy profiles where
players are maximizing their utility in expectation over other player’s types:
Et−i [ui(s(t))] ≥ Et−i [ui(s′i, s−i(t−i)] (5)
We note that a mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the class of games that we study
always exists assuming that the type space is discretized and for a sufficiently small
discretization of the strategy space. Even if the strategy and type space is not
discretized, a pure Bayes-Nash equilibrium is also guaranteed to exist in the case of
soft budget constraints under minimal assumptions (i.e. type space is a convex set
and utility share of a player is concave with respect to his submitted quality and is
differentiable with bounded slope) as was recently shown by Meirowitz [17].
We quantify the efficiency at equilibrium with respect to the ratio of the op-
timal social welfare over the worst equilibrium welfare, which is denoted as the
Price of Anarchy. Equivalently, we quantify what fraction of the optimal welfare is
guaranteed at equilibrium.
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3 Approximately Efficient Sharing Rules
In this section we analyze a generic class of sharing rules that satisfy the property
that locally each player is awarded at least his marginal contribution to the value:
uji (q
j) ≥ vj(qj)− vj(qj−i) (6)
where qj−i is the vector of qualities where player i submits 0 and everyone else
submits qji .
Several natural and simple sharing rules satisfy the above property, such as
sharing proportional to the marginal contribution or according to the local Shapley
value. 3 When the value is a concave function of the total quality submitted, then
sharing proportional to the quality:
uji (q
j) =
qji∑
k∈Nj q
j
k
vj(q
j),
satisfies the marginal contribution property. When the value is the highest quality
submission, then just awarding all the value to the highest submission (e.g. only
displaying the top response in a Q&A forum) satisfies the marginal contribution
property (see Appendix for latter claims).
We show that any such sharing rule induces a game that achieves at least a 1/2
approximation to the optimal social welfare, at any no-regret learning outcome and
at any Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the incomplete information setting where players’
abilities and budgets are private and drawn from commonly known distributions.
Our analysis is based on the recently introduced smoothness framework for games
of incomplete information by Roughgarden [22] and Syrgkanis [25], which we briefly
survey.
Smoothness of Incomplete Information Games. Consider the following class of in-
complete information games: Each player i has a type ti drawn independently from
some distribution Fi on some type space Ti, which is common knowledge. For each
type ti ∈ Ti each player has a set of available actions Ai(ti). A players strategy is a
function si : Ti → Ai that satisfies ∀ti ∈ Ti : si(ti) ∈ Ai(ti). The utility of a player
depends on his type and the actions of all the players: ui : Ti ×A→ R.
Definition 1 (Roughgarden [22], Syrgkanis [25]). An incomplete information
game is universally (λ, µ)-smooth if ∀t ∈ ×iTi there exists a∗(t) ∈ ×iAi(t) such that
for all w ∈ ×iTi and a ∈ ×iAi(w):∑
i∈N
ui(a
∗
i (t), a−i; ti) ≥ λOPT(t)− µ
∑
i∈N
ui(a;wi) (7)
Theorem 1 (Roughgarden [21,22], Syrgkanis [25]). If a game is universally
(λ, µ)-smooth then every mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the incomplete informa-
tion setting and every coarse correlated equilibrium of the complete information
setting achieves expected social welfare at least λ1+µ of the expected optimal welfare.
3 The Shapley value corresponds to the expected contribution of a player to the value if
we imagine drawing a random permutation and adding players sequentially, attributing
to each player his contribution at the time that he was added.
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It is easy to observe that our collaboration model, falls into the latter class of
incomplete information games, where the action of each player is his submitted
quality vector qi, and the set of feasible quality vectors depend on his private type:
Qi(ti) as defined in Equation (2). Last the utility of a player is only a function of
the actions of other players and not directly of their types, since it depends only on
the qualities that they submitted.
Theorem 2. The game induced by any sharing rule that satisfies the marginal con-
tribution property is universally (1, 1)-smooth.
Proof. Let t, w be two type profiles, and let q˜(t) ∈ Q(t) be the quality profile that
maximizes the social welfare under type profile t, i.e. q˜(t) = argmaxq∈Q(t) SW (q).
To simplify presentation we will denote q˜ = q˜(t), but remind that the vector depends
on the whole type profile.
Consider any quality profile q ∈ Q(w). By the fact that q˜i ∈ Qi(ti) is a valid
strategy for player i under type profile ti, we have:∑
i∈N
ui(q˜i, q−i; ti) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Mi
uji (q˜
j
i , q
j
−i)
By the marginal contribution property of the sharing rule we have that:∑
i∈N
ui(q˜i, q−i; ti) ≥
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Mi
(
vj(q˜
j
i , q
j
−i)− vj(qj−i)
)
=
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈Nj
(
vj(q˜
j
i , q
j
−i)− vj(qj−i)
)
Following similar analysis as in Vetta [26] for the case of complete information
games, we can argue that by the diminishing marginal returns property of the value
functions:
vj(q˜
j
i , q
j
−i)− vj(qj−i) ≥ vj(q˜j≤i ∨ qj≤i, qj>i)− vj(q˜j<i ∨ qj<i, qj≥i)
Where it can be seen that the right hand side is the marginal contribution of an
extra quality q˜ji added to a larger vector than the vector on the left hand side.
Specifically, the left hand side is the marginal contribution of q˜ji to q
j
−i, while the
right hand side is the marginal contribution of q˜ji to the vector (q
j
<i + q˜
j
<i, q
j
≥i).
Summing this inequality for every player in Nj we get a telescoping sum:∑
i∈Nj
vj(q˜
j
i , q
j
−i)− vj(qj−i) ≥ vj(q˜j ∨ qj)− vj(qj) ≥ vj(q˜j)− vj(qj)
Combining this with the initial inequality and using the fact that q ∈ Q(w), we get
the desired universal (1, 1)-smoothness property:∑
i∈N
ui(q˜i, q−i; ti) ≥
∑
j∈M
vj(q˜
j)−
∑
j∈M
vj(q
j) = OPT(t)−
∑
i∈N
ui(q;wi)
Corollary 1. Under a local sharing rule that satisfies the marginal contribution
property, every coarse correlated equilibrium of the complete information setting and
every mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the incomplete information game achieves
at least 1/2 of the expected optimal social welfare.
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We show that this theorem is tight for the class of games that we study and more
specifically, for the natural proportional sharing rule. The tightness holds even at
pure Nash equilibria of the complete information setting, even when all players have
the same ability and even when the equilibrium is unique. Intuitively what causes
inefficiency is that players prefer to congest a low value project with a very high
rate of success (i.e. produces almost it’s maximal value for a very small qualiy), e.g.
an easy topic, rather than trying their own luck alone on a hard project that would
yield very high value but would require a lot of effort to produce it.
Example 1. Consider the following instance: there are n players and n projects.
Every player participates in every project. Each player has a budget of effort of 1
and the quality of his submission at a project is equal to his effort. Project 1 has
value function v1(x) = 1− e−αx, where x is the total submitted quality. The rest of
the n− 1 projects have value function κ(1− e−βx). We assume that value is shared
proportional to the quality. We will define α, β and κ in such a way that the unique
equilibrium will be for all players to invest their whole budget on project 1, while
the optimal will be for each players’ efforts to be spread out among all the projects.
The uniqueness will follow from Rosen [20], since the game is a concave continuous
utility game with convex strategy spaces.
Since value functions are continuous increasing and concave, a necessary and
sufficient condition for a strategy profile to be an equilibrium is that the partial
derivative of the share of a player with respect to his quality, is equal for all the
projects that he submits a positive quality and at least as much as the partial
derivative of his share on the remaining projects. Since we want the equilibrium to
be all players putting their effort on project 1 we need that:(
x
x+ n− 1
(
1− e−a(x+n−1)
))′∣∣∣∣∣
x=1
>
(
κ(1− e−βx))′∣∣∣
x=0
For α > 1 the derivative on the left hand side is at least (n − 1)/n2. Thus a
sufficient condition for the above inequality to hold is: n−1n2 ≥ κβ. If we let κ = n−1βn2
and α → ∞ then we satisfy the required conditions. The social welfare of the
equilibrium is: SW (q) = 1− e−αn → 1.
The optimal social welfare is at least the welfare when each player picks a dif-
ferent project and devotes his whole effort:
OPT ≥ 1− e−α + (n− 1) · κ · (1− e−β) = 1− e−α + (n− 1)
2
βn2
(1− e−β)
→ 1 +
(
1− 1
n
)2
1− e−β
β
If we also let β → 0 we will have: OPTSW (q) → 1 +
(
1− 1n
)2
. As n → ∞, the above
ratio converges to 2.
3.1 Ranking Rules and Approximate Marginal Contribution
An interesting, from both theoretical and practical standpoint, class of sharing rules
is that of ranking rules. In a ranking sharing scheme, the mechanism announces a
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set of fixed portions aj1 ≥ . . . ≥ ajn, such that
∑
t a
j
t = 1. After the players submit
their qualities, each player is ranked based on some order that depends on the profile
of qualities (e.g. in decreasing quality order or in decreasing marginal contribution
order). If a player was ranked at position t then he gets a share of ajt · vj(qj). Fixed
reward rules capture several real world scenarios where the only way of rewarding
participants is ordering them in a deterministic manner and the designer doesn’t
have the freedom to award to the players arbitrary fractions of the produced value.
We show here that although such sharing rules are quite restrictive, they are
expressive enough to induce games that achieve only a logarithmic in the number of
players loss in efficiency. To achieve this we show that by setting the fixed portions
inversely proportional to the position, then every player is guaranteed at least an
log(n)-fraction of his marginal contribution.
It is then easy to generalize our analysis in Theorem 2 to show that sharing rules
that award each player a k-fraction of his marginal contribution induce a universally
(1/k, 1/k)-smooth game and hence achieve a (k+1)-approximately optimal welfare
at equilibrium.
Lemma 1. By setting coefficients ajt proportional to
1
t , the game resulting from
the ranking sharing rule, where submissions are ranked with respect to the marginal
contribution order, achieves a O(log(n))-approximation to the optimal welfare at
every coarse correlated and at every Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We will show that if at each project j we set at =
1
t·Hnj
, where nj = |Nj |
and Hn is the n-th harmonic number, then:
uji (q
j) ≥ 1
Hnj
(vj(qj)− vj(qj−i)) ≥
1
Hn
(vj(qj)− vj(qj−i)) (8)
After showing this then the theorem follows by following a similar approach as in
Theorem 2 to show that the game defined is a universally
(
1
Hn
, 1Hn
)
-smooth game,
implying an (Hn + 1)-approximation.
Observe that if under quality profile qj player i is placed at position t, then it
means that at least t players have a marginal contribution that is at least player i’s
marginal contribution. Thus we have:
vj(q
j)− vj(qj−i)∑
k∈Nj (vj(q
j)− vj(qj−k))
≤ 1
t
(9)
Thus we conclude that the share of a player is at least 1/Hnj of his share under
the sharing rule that splits the value proportional to the marginal contribution. By
Lemma 5 we know that the latter share is at least the marginal contribution of the
player to the value. Combining the two we get the desired property.
If the value is a function of the sum of the quality of submissions then a similar
guarantee is achieved if submissions are ordered in decreasing quality.
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4 Almost Optimality for Uniformly Hard Projects
In this section we identify a natural subclass of value functions for which the so-
cial welfare at equilibrium is a much higher approximation to the optimal welfare,
achieving almost 95% of the optimal. We start our quest, by observing that the
crucial factor that led to the tight lower bound presented in the previous section, is
that different projects can have a very different rate of success: the percentage in-
crease in the output for a percentage increase in the input was completely different
for different projects and at different qualities within a project. This discrepancy in
the output sensitivity was the main force driving the lower bound. In this section
we examine a broad class of functions that don’t allow for such discrepancies.
The standard economic measure that captures the sensitivity of the output of a
function with respect to a change in its input is that of elasticity.
Definition 2. The elasticity of a function f(x) is defined as: ǫf (x) =
∣∣∣ f ′(x)xf(x) ∣∣∣ .
One can show formally that the above parameter of a function has a one-to-one cor-
respondence with the ratio of the percentage change in the output for a percentage
of change in the input. Intuitively, projects whose value has the same and constant
elasticity have the same and uniform difficulty, though not necessarily the same im-
portance. Based on this reasoning, we examine the setting where all project value
functions are functions of the total quality of submissions and have constant elastic-
ity α. It can be easily seen that such functions will take the form vj(q
j) = wj ·Qαj ,
where Qj =
∑
i∈Nj q
j
i . The coefficient wj can be project specific, and will corre-
spond to the importance of a project. For such value functions we prove that the
proportional to the quality sharing mechanism achieves social welfare at any pure
Nash equilibrium of the complete information setting that is almost optimal.
We point that our class of games always possess a pure Nash equilibrium, since
they are games defined on a convex strategy space, with continuous and concave
utilities and hence the existence is implied by Rosen [20].
Theorem 3. Suppose that the project value functions are of the form vj(q
j) =
wj · Qαj , for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and wj > 0. Then, the proportional to the quality sharing
rule achieves social welfare at least 2
1−α
2−α ≥ 0.94 of the optimal social welfare at
every pure Nash equilibrium of the complete information game it defines.
Our analysis is based on the local smoothness framework of Roughgarden and
Schoppmann [23], which allows deriving tighter bounds for games where the strategy
space is continuous and convex and where the utilities are continuous and differen-
tiable. It is easy to see that the strategy spaces in our setting Qi(ti) as defined in
equation (2) are convex, by the convexity of the functions xji (·; ti).4 Additionally, it
is easy to check that the utilities of the players under the proportional sharing rule
are going to be continuous and differentiable at any point, except potentially at 0.
However, in the Appendix C we show that in equilibrium no project receives 0
total quality with positive probability. In Appendix B we show that this relaxed
4 If the effort required to produce two quality vectors qi, qˆi is at most Bi(ti), then the
effort required to produce any convex combination of them is also at most Bi(ti)
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condition is sufficient to apply the local smoothness framework to pure Nash equi-
libria. Alternatively, we can bypass this technicality by assuming there are exclusive
players who participate only at a specific project and always invest an ǫ amount of
effort. Making the latter assumption, we can use the local smoothness framework
in its full generality and our conclusion in Theorem 3 carries over to correlated
equilibria of the game (outcomes of no-swap regret learning strategies).
5 Soft Budget Constraints
So far we have analyzed the case where players have a hard constraint on their effort,
e.g. hard time constraint. In this section we relax this assumption and study the
case when instead of the budget constraint, a player incurs a cost that is a convex
function of the total effort he exerts, corresponding to a soft budget constraint on
his effort. We exhibit an interesting threshold phenomenon in the inefficiency of the
setting: if cost is linear in the total effort then the inefficiency can grow linearly with
the number of participants. However, when effort cost is strictly convex, then the
inefficiency can be at most a constant independent of the number of participants.
More formally, we will assume that each player has a cost function ci(x; ti)
that determines his cost when he exerts a total effort of x. This cost function is
also dependent on his private type ti. The total exerted effort can be expressed
with respect to the quality of submission as Xi(qi; ti) =
∑
j∈Mi x
j
i (q
j
i ; ti). Thus a
player’s utility as a function of the profile of chosen qualities is:
ui(q) =
∑
j∈Mi u
j
i (q
j)− ci (Xi(qi; ti); ti) . (10)
Unlike the previous section, the social welfare is not the value produced. Instead:
SW t(q) =
∑
i∈N ui(q; ti) =
∑
j∈M vj(q
j)−∑i∈N ci (Xi(qi; ti); ti) = V (q)− Ct(q).
We refer to V (q) as the production of an outcome q and to Ct(q) as the cost. We
first show that when a sharing rule that satisfies the marginal contribution property
is used, the production plus the social welfare at equilibrium is at least the value of
the optimal social welfare. We then use this result to give bounds on the equilibrium
efficiency parameterized by the convexity of the cost functions.
Lemma 2. Consider the game induced by any sharing rule that satisfies the marginal
contribution property and where players have soft budget constraints. Then the ex-
pected social welfare plus the expected production at any coarse correlated equilib-
rium of the complete information setting and at any Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the
incomplete information setting, is at least the expected optimal social welfare.
Sketch of Proof. Consider two type profile t, w and let q˜ be the optimal strategy
profile for type profile t. Let q ∈ Q(w). Similarly to Theorem 2 we get:∑
i∈N
ui(q˜i, q−i; ti) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Mi
uji (q˜
j , qj−i)−
∑
i∈N
ci(Xi(q˜i; ti); ti)
≥ V (q˜)− V (q) − Ct(q˜) = SW t(q˜)− V (q)
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The latter doesn’t imply formally that the game is smooth under existing definitions
of smoothness [22,25]. However, using similar random sampling techniques as the
ones in [22,25], we can show that although q˜i is not a valid deviation for a player
in the Bayesian game (since it depends on the whole type profile which he doesn’t
know), a player can simulate this deviation by random sampling other players types
and then performing the deviation corresponding to the random sample of types.
We use the latter result to derive efficiency bounds for both production and
social welfare. We assume that the sharing rule used induces a utility share that is
a concave function of a players submission quality and such that a player’s share at
0 quality is 0. More formally, we assume that: g(x) = uji (x, q
j
−i) is concave, continu-
ously differentiable and g(0) = 0. We call such sharing rules concave sharing rules.
It is easy to see that the proportional to quality sharing rule is a concave sharing
rule when the value is concave in the total quality. For general value functions, it is
also easy to see that the Shapley sharing rule is also a concave sharing rule.
We show efficiency bounds parameterized by the convexity of the cost functions,
using the elasticity of the cost function as the measure of convexity. An increasing
convex function that is zero at zero, has an elasticity of at least 1. We will quantify
the inefficiency in our game as a function of how far from 1 the elasticity of the cost
functions are. For instance, ci(x) = κ · x1+a has elasticity 1 + a.
Theorem 4. If a concave sharing rule is used and the elasticity of the cost func-
tions is at least 1 + µ then: i) the expected social welfare at any coarse correlated
equilibrium of the complete information setting and at any Bayes-Nash equilibrium
of the incomplete information setting is at least µ1+2µ of the optimal, ii) the total
value produced in equilibrium is at least 12
µ
1+µ of the value produced at the social
welfare maximizing outcome.
Proof. We will focus on the case of pure Bayes-Nash equilibria. The proof for cor-
related equilibria of the complete information setting and for mixed Bayes-Nash
equilibria is similar. We will prove only the first part of the theorem and defer to
the appendix the second part which follows a similar approach.
We will prove that if q(t) is a mixed Bayes-Nash Equilibrium then
(1 + µ)Et[C(q(t))] ≤ Et[V (q(t))] (11)
Then the theorem will follow directly by combining the above with Lemma 2.
Fix a player i and his type ti. For ease of presentation let qi = qi(ti) be his
equilibrium strategy, Xi = Xi(qi; ti) his total effort and ci(x) = ci(x; ti) his cost
function. A player’s expected utility conditional on his type ti is:
Et−i [ui(qi, q−i(t−i))] =
∑
j∈Mi
Et−i
[
uji (q
j
i , q
j
−i(t−i))
]
− ci(Xi)
By the first order conditions, for qi to be maximizing player i’s expected utility it
must be that for any j ∈Mi such that qji > 0:
∂ci(Xi)
∂qji
=
∂Et−i [u
j
i (q
j
i , q
j
−i(t−i)]
∂qji
=⇒ c′i(Xi) =
1
(xji (q
j
i ))
′
∂Et−i [u
j
i (q
j
i , q
j
−i(t−i)]
∂qji
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Otherwise player i would want to increase or decrease his submission at project j.
Multiplying the above by Xi we get:
Xi · c′i(Xi) =
∑
j∈Mi
xji (q
j
i ) · c′i(Xi) =
∑
j∈Mi
xji (q
j
i )
(xji (q
j
i ))
′
∂Et−i [u
j
i (q
j
i , q
j
−i(t−i)]
∂qji
By convexity of xji (q
j
i ) we have x
j
i (q
j
i ) ≤ qji · (xji (qji ))′:
Xi · c′i(Xi) ≤
∑
j∈Mi
qji ·
∂Et−i [u
j
i (q
j
i , q
j
−i(t−i))]
∂qji
(12)
Since uji (x, q
j
−i) is a concave function, the expectation of it over q
j
−i is also a concave
function of x that is 0 at 0. Thus the quantity on the right hand side is of the form
x · g′(x) for a concave function g(x) with g(0) = 0. Thus it is at most g(x).
Xi · c′i(Xi) ≤
∑
j∈Mi
Et−i [u
j
i (q
j
i , q
j
−i(t−i))]
By the lower bound on the elasticity of the cost functions we get:
(1 + µ)ci(Xi) ≤ Xi · c′i(Xi) ≤
∑
j∈Mi
Et−i [u
j
i (q
j
i , q
j
−i(t−i))]
Taking expectation over player i’s type and summing over all players:
(1 + µ)E[C(q(t))] ≤ Et

∑
i
∑
j∈Mi
uji (q
j(t))

 = Et

∑
j∈M
vj(q
j(t))


Observe that from this theorem, we obtain that as long as µ > 0, the efficiency
of any Nash equilibrium, is a constant independent of the number of players. For
instance, if the cost is a quadratic function of the total effort then the social welfare
at equilibrium is a 3-approximation to the optimal and the produced value is a
4-approximation to the value produced at the welfare-maximizing outcome.
The budget constraint case that we studied in previous sections can be seen as
a limit of a family of convex functions that converge to a limit function of the form
ci(xi) = 0 if xi < Bi, and∞ otherwise. Such a limit function can be thought of as a
convex function with infinite elasticity. Observe that if we take the limit as µ→∞
in the theorem above, then we get that the social welfare at equilibrium is at least
half the optimal social welfare, which matches our analysis in the previous section.
A corner case is that of linear cost functions, where our Theorem gives no mean-
ingful upper bound. In fact as the following example shows, when cost functions are
linear then the inefficiency can grow linearly with the number of agents.
Example 2. Consider a single project with value v(Q) =
√
Q and assume that the
proportional to the quality sharing rule is used. Moreover, each player pays a cost
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of 1 per unit of effort, i.e. ci(Xi) = Xi and where the quality is equal to the effort.
The global optimum is the solution to the unconstrained optimization problem:
maxQ∈R+
√
Q−Q, which leads to Q∗ = 1/4 and therefore SW (Q∗) = 1/4. On the
other hand, each player’s optimization problem is: maxqi∈R+ qi
1√
Q
−qi. By symmetry
and elementary calculus, we obtain that at the unique Nash equilibrium, the total
effort is Q =
(
n−1/2
n
)2
, and the social welfare is 2n−14n2 = O(1/n).
Linear efforts can lead to inefficiency in a generic class of examples given below.
Proposition 1. Assume that the cost function is linear c(X) = X, quality is equal
to effort and the value is a function v(Q) of the total quality such that there exists
t > 0 such that Q > v(Q), for every Q > t. Then, POA = Ω(n) for the proportional
to quality mechanism.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We analyzed a general model of collaboration under uncertainty, capturing settings
such as online social computing and scientific co-authorship. We identified simple
value sharing rules that achieve good efficiency in a robust manner with respect to
informational assumptions.
Some questions remain open for future research. We showed that ranking rules,
which are highly popular [7,8], achieve a logarithmic approximation, using fixed-
prizes independent of the distribution of qualities (prior-free) and of the game
instance. Can a constant approximation be achieved if we allow the fixed prizes
associated with each position to depend on the distribution of abilities and on the
instance of the game? Also, consider a two-stage model where in the first stage
players choose the projects to participate in and then play our collaboration game
in the second stage. Can any efficiency guarantee be given on the welfare achieved
at the subgame-perfect equilibria of this two-stage game?
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A Sharing Rules that Satisfy the Marginal Contribution
Lemma 3. The proportional sharing rule satisfies the marginal contribution con-
dition when the value functions are increasing and concave functions of the sum of
submitted qualities and the value with no submissions is 0.
Proof. Let Qj =
∑
i∈Nj q
j
i and let vj(q
j) = v˜j(Q
j). Since v˜j(Q
j) is concave and
v˜j(0) = 0 then for any y ∈ [0, Qj] : vj(y) ≥ y v˜j(Qj)Qj . By setting y = Qj − q
j
i we
obtain:
uji (q
j) = qji
v˜j(Qj)
Qj
≥ v˜j(Qj)− v˜j(Qj − qji ) = vj(qj)− vj(qj−i)
Lemma 4. When vj(q
j) = maxi∈Nj q
j
i , then awarding all the value to the highest
quality player, satisfies the marginal contribution condition.
Proof. The marginal contribution of any player other than the highest one, is 0.
The marginal contribution of the highest quality player is at most the total value.
Lemma 5. Sharing proportional to the marginal contribution:
uji (q
j
i ) =
vj(q
j)− vj(qj−i)∑
k∈Nj (vj(q
j)− vj(qj−k))
vj(q
j)
satisfies the marginal contribution condition.
Proof. By the submodularity of the value function we can show that
vj(q
j) ≥
∑
k∈Nj
(vj(q
j)− vj(qj−k))
Consider adding the players sequentially and summing the marginal contribution of
a player to the value at the time when he was added. This summation will be equal
to the final value of the project. Additionally, observe that the marginal contribution
of a player at the time that he was added is greater than his marginal contribution
to the final value, by submodularity.
Lemma 6. Sharing according to the Shapley value satisfies the marginal contribu-
tion condition.
Proof. The Shapley value of a player is defined as follows: consider a random per-
mutation of the players and consider adding the players sequentially according to
this random permutation. The Shapley value of a player is his expected marginal
contribution at the time that he is added (in expectation over all permutations).
Observe that by submodularity for any permutation, the marginal contribution
of a player at the time that he is added is at least his final marginal contribution
to the value. Thus for any permutation a player is awarded at least his marginal
contribution and therefore, in expectation he is awarded at least his marginal con-
tribution.
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B Local Smoothness for Utility Maximization Games
We will present the local smoothness framework briefly, adapted to a utility max-
imization problem instead of a cost minimization. We also slightly generalize the
framework by requiring that the player cost functions be continuously differentiable
almost everywhere only at equilibrium points.
Consider a utility maximization game 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉, where each player’s
strategy space is a continuous convex subset of a Euclidean space Rmi . Let ui :
×i∈NSi → R be the utility function for a player i, which is assumed to be con-
tinuous and concave in xi ∈ Si for each fixed value of x−i ∈ S−i. The concavity
and continuity assumptions lead to existence of a pure Nash equilibrium using the
classical result of Rosen [20]. Also for a strategy profile x ∈ ×i∈NSi we denote with
SW (x) =
∑
i∈N ui(x).
Definition 3 (Local Smoothness [23]). A utility maximization game with con-
vex strategy spaces is locally (λ, µ)-smooth with respect to a strategy profile x∗ iff for
every strategy profile x at which ui(x) are continuously differentiable:∑
i∈N
[ui(x) +∇iui(x) · (x∗i − xi)] ≥ λSW (x∗)− µSW (x)
where ∇iui ≡
(
∂ui
∂x1
i
, . . . , ∂ui
∂x
mi
i
)
.
Theorem 5 ([23]). If a utility maximization game is locally (λ, µ)-smooth with
respect to a strategy profile x∗ and ui(x) is continuously differentiable at every
pure Nash equilibrium of the game then the social welfare at equilibrium is at
least λ1+µSW (x
∗)
Proof. The proof is an adaptation of [23] for the case of maximization games. In
addition, we generalize to the case of differentiability only at equilibrium, rather
than everywhere. The latter extension is essential for the class of games that we
study.
The key claim is that if x is a pure Nash equilibrium then
∇iui(x) · (x∗i − xi) ≤ 0
Given this claim then we obtain the theorem, since:
SW (x) ≥
∑
i∈N
ui(x) +∇iui(x) · (x∗i − xi) ≥ λSW (x∗)− µSW (x)
To prove the claim define xǫ = ((1 − ǫ)xi + ǫx∗i , x−i) and observe that since ui
is differentiable at equilibrium: limǫ→0 1ǫ (ui(x
ǫ)−ui(x)) = ∇iui(x) · (x∗i −xi). Thus
if ∇iui(x) · (x∗i − xi) > 0 then for some ǫ0 it holds that ui(xǫ) − ui(x) > 0, which
means that i has a profitable deviation which contradicts the fact that x is a Nash
Equilibrium.
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C Proof of Theorem 3
Now we switch to our collaboration model which is a convex strategy space utility
maximization game. We will also assume that the proportional sharing rule is used.
We focus on the case where the project values are functions of the total submitted
quality Qj =
∑
i∈Nj q
j
i .
C.1 Differentiability at Equilibrium
To apply the generalized local smoothness framework we first need to show that
the utility functions are differentiable at every pure Nash equilibrium. For the value
functions that we consider vj(Qj) = wjQ
α
j , with α < 1, the share of each player
under the proportional sharing mechanism is uji (q
j) = wj
qj
i
Q1−α
j
.
Thus the only point where the utilities can be non-differentiable is at zero. We
will show that at any equilibrium,Qj > ∆ for some∆ > 0 that depends on the input
parameters of the game. Therefore the utilities are differentiable at equilibrium.
Lemma 7. If vj(Qj) = wjQ
α
j for some α ∈ (0, 1) then at any pure Nash equilibrium
of the game Qj > 0, for all j ∈M .
Proof. Assume that q is an equilibrium where Qj = 0 for some j. Now consider
a player i that participates at j. Let j∗ be a project on which he has invested
strictly positive effort (there must exist one by pigeonhole principle). In fact, we
can deduce that there exists a project j∗ on which the quality of his submission is
at least t = minj∈Mi x
j
i (Bi/m).
Consider the deviation where he moves a small amount of effort ǫ from j∗ to j.
This will decrease her quality on j∗ by δ = Θ(ǫ) (for sufficiently small ǫ, by Taylor’s
theorem and by strict monotonicity of xji (·)) and will increase her quality on j be
δ′ = Θ(ǫ) = Θ(δ). Let q˜ be the strategy vector after the deviation. The increase in
his share on project j is going to be wjΘ(δ
α). Thus the utility difference after the
deviation is:
ui(q˜)− ui(q) = wj · Θ(δα)− (uj
∗
i (q
j)− uji (q˜j)) =⇒
ui(q˜)− ui(q)
δ
=
wj ·Θ(δα)
δ
− u
j∗
i (q
j)− uji (q˜j)
δ
As δ → 0, qj1Θ(δ
α)
δ →∞ and
uj
∗
i (q
j)− uji (q˜j)
δ
→ −∂u
j∗
i (q
j∗ )
∂qj
∗
i
≥ −∆ > −∞
where ∆ is a lower bounded on the partial derivative of the share of player i when
Qj∗ = t.
Thus for some δ = δ0, small enough, it has to be that ui(q˜) > ui(q) and hence
q˜ is a profitable deviation for i.
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C.2 An Intermediate Lemma
In this section we will prove a lemma that applies to any concave function vj(Qj)
and not necessarily to Qαj . We will use a fact shown by [23]:
Fact 6 Let xi, yi ≥ 0 and x =
∑
i xi, y =
∑
i yi then:
∑
i xi(yi − xi) ≤ k(x, y)
where:
k(x, y) =
{
y2
4 x ≥ y/2
x(y − x) x < y/2
Lemma 8. Assume vj(Qj) are concave functions of total quality with vj(0) = 0
and are continuously differentiable at any equilibrium point of the game defined by
the proportional sharing scheme. Let v¯j(Qj) =
vj(Qj)
Qj
. Let qˆ be a strategy profile. If
for all strategy profiles q at which v¯(·) is differentiable and for all j ∈M :
Qˆj v¯j(Qj) + v¯
′
j(Qj)k(Qj , Qˆj) ≥ λ · Qˆj · v¯j(Qˆj)− µ ·Qj · v¯j(Qj)
then the game is locally (λ, µ)-smooth with respect to x∗.
Proof. Let q be some strategy profile and qˆ some other outcome. From the definition
of the proportional sharing scheme:
ui(q) =
∑
j∈Mi
qji
vj(Qj)
Qj
=
∑
j∈Mi
qji v¯j(Qj)
∇iui(q) · (qˆi − qi) =
∑
j∈Mi
∂(qji v¯j(Qj))
∂qji
(qˆji − qji ) =
∑
j∈Mi
(v¯j(Qj) + q
j
i v¯
′
j(Qj))(qˆ
j
i − qji )
Therefore, we have∑
i∈N
ui(q) +∇iui(x) · (qˆi − qi) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Mi
qji v¯j(Qj) + (v¯j(Qj) + q
j
i v¯
′
j(Qj))(qˆ
j
i − qji )
=
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Mi
qˆji v¯j(Qj) + v¯
′
j(Qj)q
j
i (qˆ
j
i − qji )
=
∑
j∈M
(
Qˆj v¯j(Qj) + v¯
′
j(Qj)
∑
i
[qji (qˆ
j
i − qji )]
)
≥
∑
j∈M
(
Qˆj v¯j(Qj) + v¯
′
j(Qj)k(Qj , Qˆj)
)
where the last inequality follows from Fact 6 and the fact that v¯j(Qj) is a non-
increasing function (by concavity of vj(Qj) and the fact that vj(0) = 0), hence
v¯′j(Qj) ≤ 0. Combining the last above inequality with the assumption of the theo-
rem, we establish the assertion of the theorem.
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C.3 Establishing the Optimal Bound
Proof of Theorem 3: Utilizing Lemma 8, we shall compute the value PoA(α)
that minimizes 1+µλ over µ, λ ≥ 0 subject to
yvˆ(x) + vˆ′(x)k(x, y) ≥ λyvˆ(y)− µxvˆ(x) for every x, y ≥ 0 (13)
where vˆ(x) = v(x)/x, v(x) = wxα, w > 0 and 0 < α ≤ 1. Without loss of generality,
we can assume w = 1. Recall that k(x, y) = 14y
2, for y/x ≤ 2, and k(x, y) = x(y−x),
otherwise. Using this and defining z = y/x, it is easily showed that condition (13)
is equivalent to hλ,µ(z) ≥ 0, for every z ≥ 0, where
hλ,µ(z) =
{
z − 1−α4 z2 − λzα + µ, z ≤ 2
αz − λzα + µ, z > 2.
We proceed with considering two different cases.
Case 1: z ≤ 2. In this case, we note that there exist z01 and z02 such that
z02 > z
0
1 > 0 and hλ,µ(z) is decreasing on [0, z
0
1)∪ (z02 ,∞) and increasing on (z01 , z02).
Now, note that h′λ,µ(2) ≥ 0 is equivalent to λ ≤ 21−α. Hence, if λ ≤ 21−α, then
infz∈[0,2] hλ,µ(z) = hλ,µ(ξ(λ)) where ξ(λ) is the smallest positive value z such that
h′λ,µ(z) = 0. On the other hand, if λ > 2
1−α, we claim that hλ,µ(z) is decreasing on
[0, 2], and hence infz∈[0,2] hλ,µ(z) = hλ,µ(2) = 1 + µ+ α− 2αλ.
We showed that in the present case, condition (13) is equivalent to: if λ ≤ 21−α,
the condition is
µ ≥ ξ(λ)α + 1− α
4
ξ(λ)2 − ξ(λ)
otherwise, if λ > 21−α, then the condition is
µ ≥ 2αλ− 1− α.
Case 2: z > 2. In this case, we note that hλ,µ(z) is a concave function with
unique minimum value over positive values at z = λ
1
1−α . Therefore, if λ ≤ 21−α,
then infz>2 hλ,µ(z) = hλ,µ(2) = 1 + µ + α − 2αλ, and otherwise, infz>2 hλ,µ(z) =
hλ,µ(λ
1
1−α ) = 1+µ−α− (1−α)λ 11−α . Therefore, we have that in the present case,
condition (13) is equivalent to: if λ ≤ 21−α, then the condition is
µ ≥ 2αλ− 1− α
otherwise, if λ > 21−α, the condition is
µ ≥ (1− α)λ 11−α − 1 + α.
Now note that
PoA(α) = PoA1(α) ∧ PoA2(α)
where
PoA1(α) = inf
λ≤21−α
max
{
1 + ξ(λ)α + 1−α4 ξ(λ)
2 − ξ(λ)
λ
,
2αλ− α
λ
}
PoA2(α) = inf
λ>21−α
max
{
2αλ− α
λ
,
(1 − α)λ 11−α + α
λ
}
.
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For PoA2(α), the minimum over all positive values of λ is at the smallest value
of λ at which the two functions under the maximum operator intersect and this is
at λ = 21−α. Therefore,
PoA2(α) =
2αλ− α
λ
|λ=21−α =
2− α
21−α
.
It remains only to show that PoA1(α) ≥ PoA2(α) and thus PoA(α) = PoA2(α).
It is convenient to use an upper bound for the first term that appears under the
maximum operator in the definition of PoA1(α). To this end, we go back to our
analysis of Case 1 and note that hλ,µ(z) ≥ z−λzα+µ+α− 1, for every 0 ≤ z ≤ 2.
Requiring that the right-hand side is greater or equal zero for every z ∈ [0, 2] is a
sufficient condition for hλ,µ(z) ≥ 0 to hold for every z ∈ [0, 2] and it yields
µ ≥ (1− α)[α α1−αλ 11−α + 1].
We thus have
PoA1(α) ≤ inf
λ≤21−α
max
{
1 + (1 − α)[α α1−αλ 11−α + 1]
λ
,
2αλ− α
λ
}
.
Now, it is easy to check that the first term under the maximum operator is greater
or equal than the second term for every λ ≤ 21−α, hence
PoA1(α) ≤ inf
λ≤21−α
2− α+ (1− α)α α1−αλ 11−α
λ
.
It can be readily checked that the right-hand side is non-increasing and hence the
infimum is achieved at λ = 21−α with the value
2− α+ 2(1− α)α α1−α
21−α
which indeed is greater than or equal to (2− α)/21−α = PoA2(α).
D Proof of Theorem 4
Proof of Theorem 4: We show here the second part of the theorem. We will
prove that if q˜(t) is the social welfare maximizing outcome for type profile t then:
(1 + µ)Et[C(q˜(t))] ≤ Et[V (q˜(t))] (14)
By the first order conditions, the social welfare maximizing outcome satisfies the
constraint that if q˜ji (t) > 0 then:
∂ci(Xi(q˜i(ti))
∂qji
=
∂vj(Q˜j(t))
∂qji
=⇒ c′i(Xi(q˜i(ti)) =
1
(xji (q˜
j
i (t)))
′ (vj(Q˜j))
′
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Thus we observe that all projects in which a player puts positive effort the right
hand side is identical. Using the above property and the convexity of xji (q
j
i ) we
obtain:
Xi(q˜i(ti)) · c′i(Xi(q˜i(ti)) =
∑
j∈Mi
xji (q˜
j
i ) · c′i(Xi(q˜i(ti)) =
∑
j∈Mi
xji (q˜
j
i )
(xji (q˜
j
i (t)))
′ (vj(Q˜j))
′
≤
∑
j∈Mi
qji · (vj(Q˜j))′
Summing over all players and using the lower bound on the elasticity of the cost
functions we obtain:
(1 + µ)C(q˜(t)) ≤
∑
i∈N
Xi(q˜i(ti)) · c′i(Xi(q˜i(ti)) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Mi
q˜ji (v
j(Q˜j))
′
=
∑
j∈M
Q˜j(vj(Q˜j))
′ ≤
∑
j∈M
vj(Q˜j) = V (q˜)
Now using Theorem 2 we obtain that for any Nash Equilibrium:
2Et[V (q(t))] ≥ Et[SW t(q(t)) + V (q(t))] ≥ Et[SW t(q˜)] = Et[V (q˜(t)) − C(q˜(t))
≥ µ
µ+ 1
Et[V (q˜(t))]
E Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1: Social welfare is given by SW(x) = v(X)−∑ni=1 c(xi)
and socially optimal allocation is such that xi = X/n for every player i, and
v′(X)− c′(X/n) = 0. (15)
Due to the symmetry, we use the notation SW(X) = v(X)− nc(X/n).
Furthermore, a Nash equilibrium allocation x is such that for every i, xi maxi-
mizes
xi
X
v(X)− c(xi).
The first order optimality condition reads as, for every i,
v(X)
X
+ xi
v′(X)X − v(X)
X2
− c′(xi) = 0.
Therefore, xi = X/n for every i, and
v′(X)− c′(X/n) +
(
1− 1
n
)
v(X)− v′(X)X
X
= 0. (16)
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It is not difficult that the Nash equilibrium of the game is optimal allocation for
a (virtual) social welfare function defined as follows
ˆSW(X) =
1
n
v(X) +
(
1− 1
n
)∫ X
0
v(y)
y
dy − nc(X/n).
As an aside remark, note since v(X) is a concave function, v(X)/X is non-increasing
over X ≥ 0 and hence, SW(X) ≤ ˆSW(X), for x ≥ 0.
In view of the identity (16), we have
SW(X) = v(X)− nc(X/n)
= v(X)− nc(X/n)−X
(
v′(X)− c′(X/n) +
(
1− 1
n
)
v(X)− v′(X)X
X
)
=
v(X)− v′(X)X
n
+ n ((X/n)c′(X/n)− c(X/n)) . (17)
We observe that (X/n)c′(X/n) − c(X/n) = 0 if and only if c(X) is a linear
function and in this case at Nash equilibrium, it holds
SW(X) =
v(X)− v′(X)X
n
.
From (15) we have that optimum social welfare is a constant, independent of n.
From (16) and the fact X ≤ t, we have that in Nash equilibrium
SW(X) ≤ maxX∈[0,t]{v(X)− v
′(X)X}
n
=
v(t)− v′(t)t
n
= O(1/n).
The result follows.
Remark 1. We observe that socially optimal and Nash equilibrium allocations are
determined by (15) and (16), respectively, where for asymptotically large n, the
behaviors of the functions v′(x) for large x and c′(x) for small x play a key role.
F Importance of Monotonicity
Throughout the paper we assumed that the value produced is monotone in the
quality of the submissions. While being a natural assumption for most of our ap-
plications one can think of collaborative settings where more effort is not always
better. What can we say about such non-monotone situations?
We show that without the monotonicity assumption then the marginal contri-
bution condition is not sufficient to guarantee a constant price of anarchy for a
generic class of examples and for the simple proportional sharing scheme. To see
this consider the case of a single project with value function v(Q) (where Q is the
total effort) that is differentiable, concave, v(0) = 0, and is single peaked, i.e. the
function is increasing for 0 ≤ Q < Q∗ and decreasing for Q > Q∗, for some Q∗ > 0.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that v(Q∗) = 1 and v(1) = 0. We assume
that |v′(1)| <∞. In this case, the maximum social welfare is V (Q∗) = 1.
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Suppose that each player has a budget of 1 and that effort is equal to submitted
quality. The payoff of player i is given by
ui(q) =
qi
Q
v(Q)
The game has a unique Nash equilibrium at which ∂∂qi ui(q) = 0. By summing this
condition over all players we get that the total quality at equilibrium must satisfy:(
1− 1
n
)
v(Q) +
1
n
v′(Q)Q = 0.
Let Q˜ be the solution to the above equation. It is easy note from the last identity
that Q∗ < Q˜ ≤ 1. By concavity, we have v(Q˜) ≥ −v′(Q˜)(1 − Q˜), which combined
with the Nash equilibrium condition yields Q˜ ≥ 1 − 1n . Therefore, the price of
anarchy is
V (Q∗)
V (Q˜)
≥ 1
v(1 − 1n )
≥ 1−v′(1)n = Θ(n).
